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Introduction
THUS FAR, NO PERSON DETAINED in America’s War on Terror1
has been sentenced to death by the U.S. government. This failure to
capitally punish a single enemy combatant has not been due to a lack
of effort on the part of the Bush Administration,2 but rather the ef-
forts of a few Americans3 and the legal impediments created by the
U.S. Supreme Court.4
In 2009, the power of Commander in Chief passed to President
Barack Obama, who has continued America’s armed conflicts across
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brothers Connor McComas, Devin McComas, and Aaron Jones. For editing and directing
the production of this Comment, I am very grateful to members of U.S.F. Law Review
Volume 44, specifically, Robin Bennett and David Starkweather.
1. “War on Terror” has been used to denote American and Allied conflicts in Iraq
and Afghanistan, as well as American and Allied covert operations across the world. The
term has “become ingrained in American national discourse,” though it is notoriously hard
to articulate and may actually mischaracterize several conflicts involving American and Al-
lied forces currently occurring across the world. See Alen Weiner, Hamdan, Terror, War, 11
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 997, 998 (2007).
2. See, e.g., Notice of Intent to Seek a Sentence of Death, United States v. Moussaoui,
282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D.Va. Mar. 28, 2002) (No. Crim. 01-455-A).
3. See, e.g., Special Verdict Form, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480
(E.D.Va. Mar. 28, 2002) (No. Crim. 01-455-A). The Moussaoui trial resulted in a hung jury
and a sentence of life in prison without parole.
4. In four landmark cases, the Supreme Court denied government arguments to cur-
tail the jurisdiction of federal courts, as well as the constitutional power of the writ of
habeas corpus. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004).
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the world. The Obama Administration has attempted to distance its
campaigns from the Bush Administration’s campaigns with the use of
terminology—i.e., by substituting “unprivileged enemy belligerent”
for “enemy combatant,”5 and “Overseas Contingency Operations” for
“War on Terror.”6 Perhaps the Obama Administration’s most provoca-
tive decision, however, has been to authorize the capital prosecutions
for six unprivileged enemy belligerents suspected of orchestrating the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, rather than subject them to
courts-martial proceedings or military commissions.7
In light of President Obama’s and Attorney General Eric Holder
Jr.’s monumental decision, this Comment explores the constitutional
requirements for the capital prosecution of unprivileged enemy bel-
ligerents accused of committing or aiding hostilities against America.
This Comment argues that, by default and largely thanks to false starts
on behalf of the Bush Administration, courts-martial proceedings and
military commissions cannot procure a constitutionally sound capital
conviction of a detainee in the War on Terror. Instead, Article III fed-
eral courts have become the primary source of criminal justice in the
War on Terror8 and the only venue that may procure a constitutional
capital sentence against a person accused of committing crimes involv-
ing terrorism. This conclusion ultimately justifies President Obama’s
decision to authorize the New York City Terror Trials.9
Part I describes the world of combatants and the effects of the
Bush Administration’s creation of a new class of combatants. Part II
provides historical background on the military’s use of courts-martial
and military commissions for capital proceedings. This Part focuses
upon the constitutional and jurisdictional limitations the Supreme
Court has placed on these tribunals. Part III evaluates Supreme Court
case law relevant to capital prosecutions of unprivileged enemy bel-
ligerents through courts-martial proceedings or military commissions.
5. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-84, § 948a(7), 123 Stat. 2209, 2575.
6. See President’s Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Global Deployments of
United States Combat Equipped Armed Forces, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 998 (Dec. 16,
2009) [hereinafter President’s Letter]; see also DEPT. OF DEFENSE, FY 2010 BUDGET REQUEST
SUMMARY JUSTIFICATION: OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 2010 (2009).
7. ERIC HOLDER, U.S. ATT’Y GEN., Attorney General Announces Forum Decisions for
Guantanamo Detainee (Nov. 13, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-
speech-091113.html.
8. RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING
TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (2009).
9. The author disagrees with the use of the death penalty as a constitutionally viable
form of punishment. Accord Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 314 (1972) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1956).
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Under constitutional scrutiny, the vague and overbroad definition of
“unprivileged enemy belligerent” poses basic problems of notice and
due process. These problems are at the root of the legal impediments
that have thus far prevented successful constitutional use of courts-
martial and military commissions for convictions of detainees in the
War on Terror. Part IV concludes by noting the Obama Administra-
tion has instituted the New York City Terror Trials in accordance with
the federal courts’ proper role in the prosecution of those accused of
terrorism.
I. Know Your Enemy
A. Who Is a Combatant?
Between the end of World War II in 1945 and the beginning of
the War on Terror in 2001, persons engaged in war were generally
divided into two classes: lawful and unlawful combatants.10 Lawful
combatants, explicitly recognized by the Geneva Conventions, possess
the right to legally kill and be killed11 in armed conflicts between
High Contracting Parties and are entitled to prisoner of war status.12
Professor Peter Jan Honigsberg has recognized that “[t]he existence
of unlawful combatants, those not recognized in the laws of war as
combatants, is implicit in the definition of lawful combatants.”13 Typi-
cally, unlawful combatants are spies, saboteurs, civilians, militia mem-
bers, or mercenaries.14 Unlawful combatants are not entitled to
engage in armed conflicts between High Contracting Parties and do
not qualify for prisoner of war status when captured.15 The terms law-
ful and unlawful combatant are internationally recognized terms cov-
ering the universe of parties who participate in armed conflicts or
subversive hostilities.16 At least such was the case prior to September
11, 2001.17
10. See Peter Jan Honigsberg, Chasing “Enemy Combatants” and Circumventing Interna-
tional Law: A License for Sanctioned Abuse, 12 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 8 (2007).
11. Id. at 9.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id. at 8.
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B. Who Is an Enemy Combatant?
The term enemy combatant was coined in 1942 by Justice Harlan
Stone as a variant reference to Nazi saboteurs18—though at the time it
lacked specific meaning.19 Following the September 11th terrorist at-
tacks in 2001, the term was imbued with new meaning and has since
been used to characterize persons detained in America’s War on Ter-
ror.20 Two separate definitions for the term have been adopted by the
Supreme Court, and Congress has issued a formal definition of enemy
combatant in the Military Commissions Act of 2006.21 While the defi-
nition has undergone repeated changes since 2001,22 the definition
for enemy combatant used in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld23 is adopted here as:
“an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or Al Qaeda
forces, or associated forces, that are engaged in hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners.”24
C. Who Is an Unprivileged Enemy Belligerent?
Congress, as directed by the Obama Administration, issued new
provisions and regulations for military commissions in the Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. The provisions are known as
the Military Commissions Act (“MCA”) of 2009, amending in entirety
Chapter 47 of the U.S. Code, Title 10. The MCA of 2009 shares many
provisions with the MCA of 2006; the most notable departure is the
Obama Administration’s new label, unprivileged enemy belligerents,
for the class of people detained in the War on Terror. The scope of
the term appears to apply more broadly than enemy combatant and is
defined as a person who:
(A) Has engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coali-
tion partners; or
18. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 8 (1942). The best definition offered by Justice Stone
was a person “who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of
waging war by destruction of life or property . . . not to be entitled to the status of prisoners
of war . . . .” Id.
19. See Honigsberg, supra note 10, at 8.
20. Id. at 49 (noting that the first definition of the term “enemy combatant” was “an
individual who, under the laws and customs of war, may be detained for the duration of
the armed conflict”).
21. Id. at 4.
22. Id. at 5 n.9.
23. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
24. Id. at 570 n.1 (2006) (citing Memorandum from Deputy Sec’y Def., Paul
Wolfowitz, to Sec’y Navy (July 7, 2004), available at http:///www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul
2004/d20040707review.pdf).
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(B) Has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against
the United States or its coalition partners; or
(C) Was a part of al Qaeda at the time of the alleged offense
under this chapter.25
D. Circumventing the Rules of War26
Both the definition of enemy combatant and unprivileged enemy
belligerent subsume the definitions for lawful and unlawful combat-
ants under the Geneva Conventions. Honigsberg describes the defini-
tions as a “confusion of terms. If enemy combatant subsumes the two
sub-categories of lawful and unlawful combatants . . . then again all we
have here is a generic term for all combatants, not a new category of
combatants.”27 The broad definitions do more than confuse terms
and conflict with international norms. They defeat the procedures
governing the Uniform Code of Military Justice and undermine the
pillars of notice, due process, and individualization guaranteed by the
Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution.
II. Combatants, the U.S. Military, and Capital Punishment
Under Articles I and II of the Constitution
A. Articles at War: “Unprivileged Enemy Belligerents” and Super
Concurrent Jurisdiction
A Commander-in-Chief has three options to capitally prosecute a
person detained as an unprivileged enemy belligerent.28 First, the trial
25. See Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-84, § 948a(7), 123 Stat. 2209,
2575. The breadth of the definition of unprivileged enemy belligerent actually makes it
more akin to the definition for enemy combatant adopted by the Supreme Court in Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004).
26. See Honigsberg, supra note 10, at 9 (“By creating a new, unauthorized class of
enemy combatants outside of international recognition and protection, the administration
was attempting to circumvent the application of the Geneva Conventions.”).
27. See id. at 54.
28. This charging determination is subject to the jurisdiction of each court and the
substantive offenses that may be brought against the unprivileged enemy belligerent by the
U.S. Military or U.S. Department of Justice. However, as will be explained below, the U.S.
Code, Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”), and Military Commissions Act of 2009
proscribe crimes based on common elements and facts tending to constitute premeditated
murder, attacks on U.S. property, or aiding hostilities against America. This is true whether
or not the crime occurs abroad or domestically. Thus, under the current expansion of the
law, courts representing Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution may each have separate
jurisdiction over the same “war crime.” The Supreme Court has recognized that failure to
hold an unprivileged enemy belligerent responsible through military commissions “does
not mean that that the Government may not, for example, prosecute by court-martial or in
federal court those caught ‘plotting terrorist atrocities like the bombing of the Khobar
Towers.’” Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 612 n.41.
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could be held through capital courts-martial proceedings,29 author-
ized under Article I of the Constitution, for crimes cognizable under
the Uniform Code for Military Justice (“UCMJ”).30 Second, the official
could create or seek congressional approval for military commissions
and administer capital prosecutions through military tribunals,31
under Article II of the Constitution,32 for crimes cognizable under the
MCA or Executive Order. Finally, the U.S. Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) could institute capital charges through an Article III forum.33
At any time, any person detained in the War on Terror could be pros-
ecuted in any given forum, with little guidance or rationale explaining
the selection of one forum over another.34
29. Taliban, Al Qaeda, and other detainees in the War on Terror held by the United
States, could be capitally tried through general courts-martial proceedings. See Uniform
Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 802(a)(9)–(10), 802(a)(12), 818 (2006) [hereinafter
UCMJ]. This includes any detainee held at Guantanamo Bay. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 620 n.47
(citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)).
30. General courts-martial proceedings are authorized by the UCMJ, which was
promulgated by Congress pursuant to its Article I powers. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See also
Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857) (“These provisions show that Congress
has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offences . . .
without any connection between it and the 3d article of the Constitution defining the
judicial power of the United States; indeed, . . . the two powers are entirely independent of
each other.”).
31. See UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 821, 836 (2006); id. §§ 948b(a)–(d).
32. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (granting executive power to form tribunals and mili-
tary commissions).
33. Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees could be capitally prosecuted through civilian
courts if their crimes are proscribed by the U.S. Code. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. (“The
judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States . . . .”).
34. Tung Yin, Enemies of the States: Rational Classification in the War on Terrorism, 11
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 903, 904 (2007) (“In practice, the government’s decisions of
whether to treat a given suspected terrorist as a criminal defendant or as an enemy combat-
ant has not followed any discernable algorithm.”). In fact, a given defendant may appear in
more than one forum. See ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 8, at 14. Al-Marri underwent an
eight-year journey through the federal courts and military commissions before ultimately
pleading guilty in a federal court. Originally, he was charged with financial fraud, false
identity, and false statements in a federal court. After being adjudicated an enemy combat-
ant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (“CSRT”), he was then detained for over five
years in a naval brig in South Carolina where he awaited trial by military commission. In
2009, his charges in federal court were reinstated and he has since pled guilty to materially
aiding hostilities against America in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339 (2006). Id.
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B. Rules and Procedures for Capital Courts-Martial Proceedings
1. Jurisdiction
The UCMJ defines the substantive law governing military courts
and courts-martial proceedings.35 There are three types of courts-mar-
tial proceedings: summary, special, and general.36 General courts-mar-
tial proceedings are reserved for felonies including capital
prosecutions.37 Eligibility for trial through courts-martial is most com-
monly based on a person’s status and not necessarily his/her crimes
or geographical location.38 Hypothetically, an unprivileged enemy
belligerent could be tried through courts-martial proceedings as a
prisoner of war or person detained by the American government
outside the United States.39
2. Rules for Capital Courts-Martial Proceedings
The UCMJ and the Rules of Courts Martial govern the proce-
dures, substantive offenses, and terms of appellate review in capital
courts-martial proceedings. Capital courts-martial cases are also gov-
erned by the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court.40 Accordingly,
the military’s capital sentencing scheme must rationally narrow the
class of death eligible offenders and meet heightened standards of
reliability, as imposed by the Eighth Amendment, in all capital cases.41
The court in United States v. Matthews42 recognized that capital
courts-martial proceedings must conform to the Supreme Court’s de-
cisions in Furman v. Georgia,43 Gregg v. Georgia,44 and Woodson v. North
35. See UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 881, 906, 918–19 (2006) (defining: conspiracy, spy, espio-
nage, premeditated murder, and manslaughter, respectively).
36. Id. § 816 (Courts-Martial Classified).
37. Id. § 818 (Jurisdiction of General Courts-Martial); see also David J. R. Frakt, An
Indelicate Balance: A Critical Comparison of the Rules and Procedures for Military Commissions and
Courts-Martial, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 315 (2007).
38. See UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 802 (2006).
39. See id. §§ 802(9)–(12).
40. Id. § 855; see also United States v. Matthews, 16 M.J. 354, 368 (C.M.A. 1983) (quot-
ing United States v. Wappler, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 393, 396 (1953) (“In enacting Article 55, Con-
gress ‘intended to grant protection covering even wider limits than that afforded by the
Eighth Amendment’”)).
41. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972);
Matthews, 16 M.J. 354.
42. 16 M.J. 354 (C.M.A. 1983).
43. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
44. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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Carolina45.46 These cases prohibit capital sentencing schemes that
function arbitrarily or capriciously by requiring the adaptation of pro-
cedures in capital cases that narrow the class of offenders eligible for
the death penalty and meet heightened standards of reliability.47 The
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has also recognized that all
capital courts-martial proceedings must adopt sentencing procedures
that “individualize [the] determination on the basis of the character
of the individual and the circumstances of the crime . . . in an objec-
tive, evenhanded and substantively rational way . . . .”48
The UCMJ authorizes the death penalty for fourteen crimes.49
These include several crimes applicable to the hypothetical capital
courts-martial case involving an unprivileged enemy belligerent, such
as premeditated murder, war crimes, various crimes of espionage, and
destruction of military property.50
The Rules of Courts Martial (“RCM”) govern the procedures for
capital courts-martial proceedings.51 The procedures are tailored to
satisfy the Eighth Amendment’s heightened reliability requirements
in capital cases.52 The RCM requires, along with other safeguards,
unanimity in the penalty determination and automatic appellate re-
view by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.53 Prior to the
imposition of a death sentence, the jury must convict the defendant of
a capital offense, find the existence of a statutory aggravating factor,
and find that the “mitigating factors54 are substantially outweighed by
45. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
46. Matthews, 16 M.J. at 368.
47. See id. at 370–74.
48. Id. at 379 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983)).
49. See UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 802 (2006) (assaulting or willfully disobeying superior com-
missioned officer); id. § 885 (desertion); id. § 894 (mutiny); id. § 899 (misbehavior before
the enemy); id. §§ 900–02 (subordinate compelling surrender); id. § 904 (improper use of
countersign); id. § 906 (forcing a safeguard); id. § 910 (aiding the enemy, spying, espio-
nage); id. § 913 (improperly hazarding a vehicle); id. § 918 (misbehavior of sentinel); id.
§ 920 (premeditated murder, felony-murder, and rape ).
50. UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 904, 908, 910, 918 (2006).
51. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 753–54 (1995).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 750–54.
54. See Lt. Michael Montgomery, Death Is Different: Kreutzer and the Right to a Mitigation
Specialist in Military Capital Offense Cases, ARMY LAWYER 13, 16 (February 2007) (Mitigation
investigation searches for evidence that: “(1) portrays any positive qualities the defendant
possesses, (2) makes the defendant’s violent acts ‘humanely understandable in light of his
past history and the unique circumstances affecting his formative development,’ (3) tends
to show that his life in prison would likely be productive, or at least not be threatening to
others, (4) rebuts the prosecutor’s evidence of aggravating circumstances, (5) provides
evidence of extenuating circumstances surrounding the capital crime itself.”).
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the aggravating factors.”55 In Loving v. United States,56 the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of these procedures under the
Eighth Amendment.57
In a number of other cases, military courts have sought, in line
with Supreme Court precedents, to ensure the reliability of capital
courts-martial proceedings. The Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces has adopted and enforced added procedural and substantive
rights for capital defendants.58 For example, in all capital cases the
court has required effective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct
appellate review, while also finding that ineffective assistance of coun-
sel may constitute prejudice and reversible error.59 Likewise, the mili-
tary courts have held that defendants in capital courts-martial
proceedings have the right to present a wide-range of evidence in mit-
igation and that the erroneous denial of a request for the appoint-
ment of a mitigation specialist60 constitutes reversible error.61 In sum,
the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has made clear that all
capital courts-martial proceedings require, “competent counsel; [a]
full and fair opportunity to present exculpatory evidence; individual-
ized sentencing procedures; fair opportunity to obtain the services of
experts; and fair and impartial judges and juries.”62
C. Rules and Procedures for Capital Military Commissions
1. Jurisdiction
Military commissions are born of military necessity in times of
war, and are not themselves constitutionally suspect. Military commis-
sions may be administered by Executive Order pursuant to congres-
sional approval, the UCMJ, and the Executive’s plenary powers in war
55. Id.; Rules for Courts-Martial §§ 1004–1006, Exec. Order No. 13468, 73 Fed. Reg.
43, 827 (July 24, 2008).
56. 517 U.S. 748 (1995).
57. Id. at 750.
58. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (“This conclusion rests
squarely on the predicate that the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sen-
tence of imprisonment, however long.”).
59. United States v. Curtis, 44 M.J. 106 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
60. See Montgomery, supra note 54, at 16.
61. See United States v. Kreutzer, 59 M.J. 773, 778–80 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2004); United
States v. Allen, 31 M.J. 572, 623 (C.M.R. 1990) (“Military due process entitles a ser-
vicemember to the assistance of an expert when necessary to the preparation of an ade-
quate defense.”).
62. United States v. Murphy, 50 M.J. 4, 15 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
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time under Article II.63 The Executive’s authority stems from the pow-
ers jointly granted to the President and Congress in times of war.64 Of
particular importance here are the congressional Authorization for
Use of Military Forces Against Terrorists,65 the congressional Authori-
zation for Use of Military Forces Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,66
and Article 21 of the UCMJ67 that all authorize the use of military
commissions. Pursuant to these congressional declarations and the
Executive’s plenary powers under Article II, on November 13, 2001,
the Bush Administration promulgated military commissions intended
to govern the “Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citi-
zens in the War Against Terrorism.”68 After the U.S. Supreme Court
struck the Bush Administration’s military commissions, Congress and
the Executive first responded by passing the MCA of 2006 (later
amended by the MCA of 2009).69
Historically, military commissions have been used in three situa-
tions: (1) as a substitute for civilian courts during martial law, (2) as a
substitute for civilian courts in occupied countries, and (3) as “inci-
dents to the conduct of war” for enemies who have violated the laws of
war.70 The military commissions formed to prosecute unprivileged en-
emy belligerents under the MCA of 2009 operate in the second and
third historical situations.
2. Historical Precedents
There is ample precedent for the imposition of capital punish-
ment through military commissions. Military commissions have histor-
ically utilized several procedural safeguards, including particularized
notice, lengthy adversarial proceedings, and qualified counsel. The
63. See supra text accompanying notes 33–34. The Supreme Court has noted that
“[t]rial by military commission raises separation-of-powers concerns of the highest order.”
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 638 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring).
64. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 10, 11, 12, 14; Hamdan, 548
U.S. 557; In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1942).
65. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
66. Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498.
67. UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2006).
68. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001); see Hamdan,
548 U.S. at 568.
69. See Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-84, § 949(a), 123 Stat. 2209,
2575.
70. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 595–96.
Spring 2010] ARTICLE III & UNPRIVILEGED ENEMY BELLIGERENTS 989
use of commissions to prosecute alleged terrorists is not necessarily a
novel idea.71
In In re Application of Yamashita,72 the Commanding General of
the Japanese Army was tried for violating the Articles of War after he
failed to prevent his troops from committing atrocities in the Philip-
pines.73 He was informed of his charges through a bill of particulars,74
286 witnesses testified during the course of the proceedings,75 and
ultimately he was sentenced to death. This was despite the efforts of
six appointed defense attorneys.76 General Yamashita was given full
appellate review of his case on direct appeal and an opportunity to
challenge the commission’s creation and jurisdiction on post-convic-
tion appeals.77 Moreover, the proceedings conformed to international
law.78
In Ex Parte Quirin,79 Nazi saboteurs were sentenced to death after
being tried for charges listed in the Articles of War.80 The five spies
were tried in front of military tribunals commissioned by President
Roosevelt’s Executive Order.81 The military commissions were held in
front of secret tribunals on American soil, but afforded the five sabo-
teurs procedures acceptable under international law.82 Five days
before trial, the spies received a five-count indictment that specifically
described their charges and the basis for those charges.83
Finally, in Johnson v. Eisentrager,84 twenty-one German nationals,
in service in China during World War II, were arrested for violating
the laws of war by continuing to engage in hostilities following the
71. See Brian J. Foley, Guantanamo and Beyond: Dangers of Rigging the Rules, 97 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1009, 1036 (2007).
72. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14 (1946).
73. Id. It should be noted here that the Supreme Court has recognized its troubles
with Yamashita and that “the force of that precedent, however, has been seriously under-
mined by post-World War II developments.” Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 618. The Court has cited
with approval the opinions by the dissenting justices, stressing the lack of procedural safe-
guards in General Yamashita’s trial. Id. (citing Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 41–81 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting)).
74. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 14.
75. Id. at 5.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 25–26.
78. Id. at 22–25 (discussing Yamashita’s status under the Geneva Convention of 1929).
79. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
80. Id. at 8.
81. Appointment of a Military Commission, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 7, 1942); see Quirin,
317 U.S. at 22.
82. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 34 n.12 (discussing international law).
83. Id. at 23.
84. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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German surrender in 1945. They were tried by military tribunals com-
missioned by the Joints Chief of Staff and charged in particularity for
conduct in violation of the Laws of War.85 Prior to trial they were
given representation by counsel and permitted the opportunity to re-
but the accusations in a preliminary hearing. At trial, they were al-
lowed to introduce evidence on their own behalf and were permitted
to fully cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses.86 Ultimately, their
convictions were upheld and the German nationals took the opportu-
nity to challenge the jurisdiction of the commissions through post-
conviction appeals.87 More importantly, their trials conformed to the
Geneva Convention’s requirements for trials involving war crimes.88
3. Modern Precedents
The Court has yet to comment on the constitutional validity of
the military commissions created by the MCA of 2006 or 2009. The
Court has, however, indicated what jurisdictional requirements, pre-
trial procedures, trial procedures, and substantive offenses may be
constitutionally required for the prosecution of unprivileged enemy
belligerents by military commissions. These principles must be de-
duced from the Court’s consideration of the military commissions cre-
ated by Executive Order in 2001, the Combatant Status Review
Tribunals (“CSRTs”), the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, and sec-
tion 7 of the MCA of 2006.89
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,90 the Court found that a detainee must re-
ceive “notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair oppor-
tunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral
decisionmaker.”91 The Court also recognized the President’s power to
detain individuals who fought against the United States in Afghani-
stan for the duration of the conflict as a fundamental incident of the
war.92 Through a balancing determination, the Court held that de-
85. Id. at 766.
86. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2259–60 (2008).
87. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763.
88. Id. at 789.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (Supp. 2007). Thus, this Comment draws its argument that
the MCA of 2009 is unconstitutional in case of a capital prosecution of “unprivileged en-
emy belligerents” by analogy to particulars of the Court’s response in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
547 U.S. 510 (2005), Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484–85 (2004), Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557 (2006), and Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, to the procedures utilized by the
Bush Administration to detain and prosecute “enemy combatants.”
90. 547 U.S. 510 (2005).
91. Id. at 533.
92. Id. at 518.
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tainees had the right to some procedural system by which to challenge
their detention.93 In accordance, “the Deputy Secretary of Defense es-
tablished [CSRTs] to determine whether individuals detained at
Guantanamo were ‘enemy combatants.’”94
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,95 the Court struck the military commis-
sions created by Executive Order in 2001 because their “structure and
procedures violated both the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions.”96
Moreover, a plurality of the Court has also found that the charge of
“one count of conspiracy ‘to commit . . . offenses triable by military
commission’”97 as an enemy combatant does not constitute “an of-
fense . . . [that] by the law of war may be tried by military commis-
sions.”98 The Court found that the jurisdiction stripping provisions of
the Detainee Treatment Act were unconstitutional in that the statute
failed to properly suspend the writ of habeas corpus.99
In Boumediene v. Bush,100 the Court found that section 7 of the
MCA of 2006, which stripped federal courts of the ability to hear en-
emy combatants claims of writ of habeas corpus, violated the constitu-
tional right to habeas corpus implied by the Suspension Clause and
granted to all persons detained by the U.S. government.101 The Court
held that enemy combatants possess the constitutional right to chal-
lenge their detention through petition for writ of habeas corpus.102
The Court did indicate that the reach of the writ may be diminished
based upon the status of the detainee and the sufficiency of process
used to determine that status.103
In issuing these holdings, the Court has struck the military com-
missions created by Executive Order in 2001, finding the entire
scheme suffered from procedural deficiencies.104 It also struck section
7 of the MCA of 2006 and found that the section “effects an unconsti-
93. Id. at 537.
94. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241.
95. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
96. Id. at 567.
97. Id. at 566.
98. Id. at 567.
99. Id. at 558.
100. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
101. Id.; Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484–85 (2004). In Rasul, the Court found that the
federal courts had jurisdiction to hear writ of habeas corpus suits of persons detained at
Guantanamo Bay. Id. at 483. The novelty of the case is the extension of federal court juris-
diction to a military installation because the United States government has de jure sover-
eignty over Guantanamo Bay. Id. at 484.
102. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229.
103. Id. at 2259.
104. Id. at 2269.
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tutional suspension of the writ.”105 As a remedy, Congress and the
Obama Administration issued the MCA of 2009.
4. The Military Commissions Act of 2009
The MCA of 2009, Manual for Military Commissions, and the
Regulations for Trial by Military Commissions prescribe the procedu-
ral and substantive elements of modern military commissions.106
Though the MCA of 2009 substituted several new provisions,107 in sum
the structure of the MCA of 2006 and 2009 are similar. Whether the
MCA of 2009 has cured constitutional deficiencies noted in the prior
scheme is an open question.108
Procedurally, the MCA of 2009 claims to utilize “the procedures
for trial by general courts-martial . . . .”109 Any commissioned and ac-
tive officer of the Armed Forces is eligible to serve on a commis-
sion,110 so long as at least five members serve in an ordinary
commission and twelve in a capital commission.111 A guilty verdict
may be reached by two-thirds of the members of the commission and
a capital sentence meted if all the members concur in the penalty of
death.112 Each military commission is presided over by a military
judge who is a commissioned officer of the armed forces,113 and is
protected from punishment by the convening authorities based on
their findings or sentences.114 The prosecution and defense counsel
must be judge advocates generals selected by the Secretary of
Defense.115
Substantively, the MCA of 2009 guarantees unprivileged enemy
belligerents several rights including the right to cross examination,
105. Id. at 2238.
106. See Frakt, supra note 37, at 330–31. Frakt mentions the MCA of 2006 since the
article predated October 2009. As discussed, however, the MCA of 2006 and 2009 are simi-
lar and many of the provisions of the MCA of 2006 at issue in the Frakt article are also
present in the MCA of 2009.
107. See id. at 332.
108. See id.
109. 10 U.S.C. § 948b(c) (2006).
110. Id. § 948i(a) (explaining eligible officer must be specifically selected by the con-
vening authority based upon several qualifications).
111. Id. § 948m.
112. Id. § 949m.
113. Id. § 948j(a).
114. Id. § 949b(a).
115. Id. §§ 948k(4)(b)–(c).
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the right to be present at trial,116 the right to counsel, the right to self-
representation,117 and protections against double jeopardy.118 The
MCA of 2009 also grants unprivileged enemy belligerents the same
protections against cruel and unusual punishment defined in the
UCMJ.119 However, the MCA of 2009 explicitly withholds from un-
privileged enemy belligerents rights against unreasonable search and
seizure, protections against compulsory self-incrimination, protections
against testimonial hearsay,120 the right to speedy trial,121 and the
right to pretrial discovery of exculpatory evidence if deemed confi-
dential.122 More troublesome is the fact that it allows the government
to use confidential information against the accused without disclosure
so long as it is described by generic categories.123
The MCA of 2009 outlines thirty-two potential criminal charges
applicable to principles,124 conspirators, and accessories after the
fact.125 Convictions resulting from sixteen of the listed crimes may po-
tentially result in a capital sentence.126 However, the Act does not re-
quire notification of the accused prior to the swearing of charges.127
If any charges are sustained, the convening authority first reviews
the conviction and sentence, then modifies it, orders a rehearing, or
issues a conviction based on a lesser included offense.128 Thereafter,
any conviction is automatically referred to the U.S. Court of Military
Commission Review,129 then the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
116. Id. § 949a(b)(2). The right to be present has limitations, as the accused may, after
prior notice, be excluded from the proceedings to ensure the physical safety of individuals
and to prevent disruption of the proceedings. Id. § 949d(d)(1)(2).
117. Id. § 949a(b)(2).
118. Id. § 949h.
119. Id. § 949s.
120. Id. § 949a(b)(3)(A)(B)(D).
121. Id. § 948b(d)(1)(A). The section also includes a “catch-all” exemption from other
provisions in the UCMJ. Id. § 948b(d)(2).
122. Id. §§ 949p-1, 949p-4, 949p-6.
123. Id. § 949p-6(b).
124. Id. §§ 950t(1)–(32).
125. Id. §§ 950q, 950r.
126. Capital charges could potentially include: murder of protected persons, attacking
civilians, taking hostages, employing poison, using protected persons as shields, torture,
cruel and inhuman treatment, intentionally causing serious bodily injury, mutilating or
maiming, murder in violation of the law of war, using treachery or perfidy, hijacking or
hazarding a vessel or aircraft, terrorism, spying, conspiracy, and solicitation. See id.
§§ 950t(1)–(2), 950t(7)–(9), 950t(11)–(15), 950t(17), 950t(23)–(24), 950t(27),
950t(29)–(30).
127. Id. § 948q(b).
128. Id. §§ 950b, 950e–950f.
129. Id. §§ 950c, 950f.
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of Columbia Circuit130 and, ultimately on petition for certiorari, to
the U.S. Supreme Court.131 However, the MCA limits review by federal
courts to “questions of law” based on the record.132
It is telling that the Obama Administration has not placed its faith
in military commissions to secure a constitutional conviction against
unprivileged enemy belligerents for capital crimes. By electing to
prosecute the six suspected September 11th masterminds in an Article
III court, the Obama Administration has implicitly revealed its doubts
surrounding the constitutional legitimacy of tribunals created by the
MCA of 2009. The decision is not shocking, however, given the consti-
tutional impediments to securing a death sentence against an un-
privileged enemy belligerent through a military tribunal.
III. Capital Prosecution Through Courts-Martial Proceedings
and Military Commissions Violates the Uniform
Code for Military Justice and the Fifth and
Eighth Amendments
Since 2002, the term enemy combatant has been used by the
American government to detain combatants in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
across the globe. In three cases, the Supreme Court has acquiesced to
the government’s terminology and definition of enemy combatant.133
The Court has thereby constitutionalized the vague and overbroad
term. The Court’s acceptance of enemy combatant has been argued as
an “error in judgment” and judicial “permission to deprive people of
their internationally recognized rights and protections.”134 This Part
explores the constitutionality of the term unprivileged enemy belliger-
ent if and when it is used by the American government to deprive
people of their lives through capital courts-martial proceedings or
capital tribunals under Articles I and II of the Constitution.
A. Capital Prosecution Through Courts-Martial Proceedings
Violates the Fifth and Eighth Amendments
Courts-martial proceedings may be used to capitally prosecute
unprivileged enemy belligerents.135 The proceedings must conform to
130. Id. § 950g.
131. Id. § 950g(e).
132. Id. § 950g(d).
133. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557, 570 n. 1 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. 510, 517 (2005).
134. See Honigsberg, supra note 10, at 4.
135. See HOLDER, supra note 7.
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the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.136 In the hy-
pothetical capital prosecution of an unprivileged enemy belligerent,
these requirements pose significant procedural barriers to the Execu-
tive’s ability to uphold a capital conviction reached through courts-
martial proceedings.
First and foremost, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces and the jurisdiction of all capital courts-martial pro-
ceedings rest upon the detainee’s wartime status. Here, the court’s
jurisdiction turns upon the government’s allegations that the detainee
is an unprivileged enemy belligerent.137 These terms conflict with the
language used by the UCMJ, as well as international norms, because
they fail to identify whether an individual detainee is in fact a lawful or
unlawful combatant entitled to prisoner of war status or war criminal
status. The allegation that a detainee is an unprivileged enemy bellig-
erent thus fails to provide any specific or cognizable grounds by which
to establish the jurisdictional purview of the courts-martial power as
required by the UCMJ.138 This is especially true in the context of a
capital courts-martial case, where the military’s unilateral designation
of a person as an unprivileged enemy belligerent poses serious ques-
tions of due process and risks to the reliability of the proceedings.139
Second, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has repeat-
edly recognized that the Eighth Amendment requires application of
United States v. Matthews’140 narrowing and sentencing principles to
capital courts-martial proceedings. Thus, to reach a death verdict, the
jury’s sentence must be based upon an “individualized determination
on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances
of the crime.”141 In cases involving unprivileged enemy belligerents,
individualization between detainees is impossible since the term fails
to meaningfully distinguish between lawful combatants and unlawful
combatants. Detainees would thus be unable to defend against a sen-
tence of death on the basis they were a prisoner of war who could
136. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 754–55 (1996).
137. See ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 8, at 21.
138. 10 U.S.C. §§ 802(9)–(10) (2006).
139. See Frakt, supra note 37, at 338 (“The designation of a detainee as an ‘enemy
combatant’ subjects the detainee to the jurisdiction of military commissions and poten-
tially to the death penalty. Such a critical designation should not be left to military officers
with no legal training and no judge to guide them.”). Id.
140. 16 M.J. 354 (C.M.A. 1983).
141. Id. at 377.
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legally kill on the battlefield, or an unlawful combatant who was per-
haps a citizen and intruding on the battlefield.142
Third, the term unprivileged enemy belligerent covers conduct
committed by both lawful and unlawful combatants working for the
Taliban, Al Qaeda, their own behalf, or on the behalf of any number
of other groups and states hostile to America. In this respect, no evi-
dence could successfully individualize the wartime status of detainees
held as unprivileged enemy belligerents.143 The term is applicable to
every foreign citizen, American citizen, financier, politician, terrorist,
provincial warlord, armed forces member, spy, prisoner of war, or
criminal detained and accused of hostilities towards the U.S. govern-
ment.144 Thus, persons detained under the overbroad and vague term
could have been lawful or unlawful combatants, and their conduct
may have been legal or illegal within the context of war. The term
unprivileged enemy belligerent thus fails to narrow the class of death-
eligible offenders “in an objective, evenhanded, and substantively ra-
tional way . . . .”145 In sum, these impediments would substantially
deter the Obama Administration from pursuing capital charges
against an unprivileged enemy belligerent through courts-martial.
B. Capital Prosecution Through Military Commissions Violates the
Fifth and Eighth Amendments
In the alternative to capital courts-martial proceedings, the Exec-
utive could administer capital prosecutions of unprivileged enemy bel-
ligerents through military commissions.146 In fact, under the Bush
Administration, ten cases were referred to commissions, including the
five suspected September 11th co-conspirators.147 Under the Obama
Administration, five individuals have been referred to commissions.148
142. See Honigsberg, supra note 10.
143. Matthews, 16 M.J. at 379.
144. See supra Part I.C–D.
145. Matthews, 16 M.J. at 379. Likewise, the term unprivileged enemy belligerent renders all
enemies as an “undifferentiated mass,” subject to indefinite detention by the American
government. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (“A process that
accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and record of the individual
offender or the circumstances of the particular offense excludes from consideration in
fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating
factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons convicted of
a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a face-
less, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.”).
146. See ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 8.
147. See Frakt, supra note 37, at 324.
148. Charlie Savage, Trial for 9/11 Suspects Set To Be in N.Y., S.F. CHRON., Nov. 14, 2009.
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The Supreme Court has already held a provision of the MCA of 2006
unconstitutional and, despite the MCA of 2009’s changes to Chapter
47 of the U.S. Code, Title 10, the constitutionality of the scheme is an
open question.149 It is not surprising then that the Obama Administra-
tion has repudiated the term enemy combatant and promulgated new
military commissions as part of continuing military operations in Af-
ghanistan.150 The term unprivileged enemy belligerent has both ex-
panded the class of detainees and the accompanying constitutional
problems.
The Court has held that military commissions by Executive Order
failed to satisfy “the most basic precondition” of military commissions;
that is, military necessity.151 Likewise, members of the Court have held
that the MCA’s overbroad charge of conspiracy to commit crimes tria-
ble by military commission conflicts with the laws of war.152 Current
military commissions authorized by the MCA of 2009 and held in ei-
ther Guantanamo Bay, Fort Bragg, or other forums removed from Af-
ghanistan and Iraq, would appear to fail this test. Likewise, by utilizing
conspiracy charges, military commissions have intruded into the de-
tention models historically retained by the criminal justice system153
and have violated Winthrop’s historical precondition that commis-
sions only address violations of the laws of war.
Second, military commissions have historically based their juris-
diction on the detainee’s wartime status as lawful or unlawful combat-
ants and their status as a prisoner of war or war criminal. Never before
has a military commission been formed to try unprivileged enemy bel-
ligerents. Here, the vagueness that permeates the definition of the
term would infect the constitutionality of a capital conviction secured
through military commission. While the Supreme Court has accepted
the government’s terminology in the past, a conviction, especially a
capital conviction, of an unprivileged enemy belligerent might pro-
149. See Montgomery, supra note 54.
150. See President’s Letter, supra note 6.
151. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 612 (2006) (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,
487 (2004)).
152. Id. at 610. However, the plurality was quick to note that this error could be cured
by Congress. Id. at 601–02. Congress has subsequently taken the opportunity to define the
crime of conspiracy in the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 950(t)(29). Thus,
it is an open question whether codification of “conspiracy to commit crimes . . . cognizable
through military commissions” is in accordance with the laws of war.
153. See Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and
Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1118 (2008) (noting the convergence of
the criminal justice system and military commission particularly in cases involving
conspiracy).
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vide the fodder necessary to examine the constitutionality of the term
and challenge the President’s power to detain.154
Third, the Court has recognized that to determine the scope of
habeas review requires an analysis of the “sum total of procedural pro-
tections afforded to the detainee at all stages, direct and collateral.”155
While this requirement is relevant to the determination of the Court’s
jurisdiction, its discussion provides insight into the procedures for mil-
itary commissions. The Court has indicated procedures related to the
exclusion of the defendant from his trial, the disclosure of classified
information, evidentiary strictures for the admission of testimonial evi-
dence, the unanimity of the jury panel, the appellate process, powers
of the convening and appointing authorities, the assignment of
judges, and the power of direct and collateral review of any convic-
tions by federal courts are a concern.156 Perhaps most importantly,
the Court has recognized the significance of “risk of error in the tribu-
nal’s findings of fact” as an important factor when considering the
constitutionality of the tribunal.157
In contrast to the procedures historically utilized by military com-
missions, the MCA of 2009 fails to provide minimal requirements of
notice, compulsory process and independent appellate review that
typically accompany charges and convictions under the Articles of
War and international law.158 Discretionary sentencing systems under
the convening authority’s review pose additional constitutional issues
of notice, due process, and fundamental fairness.159 Similarly, restric-
tions on the defendant’s access to confidential information, including
confidential information submitted at trial against him,160 pose issues
of compulsory process and the right to confrontation. Additional is-
sues are also raised by the explicit withholding of protections against
unreasonable search and seizure, protections against compulsory self-
154. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2272 (2008) (“Thus a challenge to the
President’s authority to detain is, in essence, a challenge to the Department’s definition of
enemy combatant . . . .”).
155. Id. at 2269.
156. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 614–15, 647–51 (2006); see also Boumediene,
128 S. Ct. at 2269–70.
157. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2270. Here, scholarship has documented that the CSRT
proceedings create a significant risk of error. See Foley, supra note 71, at 1009.
158. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 603–08 (distinguishing the procedures used in Quirin and
Yamashita from the procedures given to Hamdan).
159. See Brian Wolensky, Discretionary Sentencing in Military Commissions: Why and How the
Sentencing Guidelines in the Military Commission Act Should Be Changed, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 721,
742 (2009).
160. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 949p-6(b)–(d), 949p-7 (2009).
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incrimination, protections against testimonial hearsay,161 and the
right to a speedy trial.162
Fourth, the Court has indicated that a factor in determining the
constitutionality of military commissions is any procedural deviation
between the commissions and courts-martial proceedings under the
UCMJ and RCM.163 In order to justify procedural deviations by mili-
tary commissions, the Court has required a showing of impracticability
in applying the rules of courts-martial.164 Here, recent scholarship by
those directly involved in the commissions indicates that many of the
deviations between military commissions and courts-martial proceed-
ings are not pragmatically justified.165 Similarly, other scholarship has
indicated that selectively choosing and excluding provisions from the
UCMJ may subject military commissions to constitutional chal-
lenges.”166 In both instances, the circumstances of a capital case and
the MCA of 2009’s failure to adopt the provisions listed in the RCM,
including bifurcated proceedings and sentencing determinations in
line with Supreme Court Authority, establish irreconcilable deviations
between modern military commissions and capital courts-martial.167
In an evaluation of the MCA of 2009, the Court will compare the
procedures historically used by military commissions to the proce-
dures utilized by the MCA of 2009. They will determine if the MCA
161. Id. §§ 949a(3)(A)–(B), 949a(3)(D).
162. Id. § 948b(d)(1)(A).
163. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 624–25.
164. Id.
165. See Frakt, supra note 37, at 330. Frakt explains the significant differences between
courts-martial proceedings and military commissions of 2006. The pretrial procedures in
military commissions differ from courts-martial proceedings in that they base jurisdiction
on a person’s status as an “enemy combatant,” fail to impose a minimum age limitation, fail
to impose a statute of limitations, fail to impose limits on the length of pre-trial detention,
failing to grant detainees the right to a speedy trial, not requiring referral of charges,
restricting discovery, and restricting access to witness and evidence. Id. The trial process
used in military commissions differs from the process used in courts-martial proceedings in
matters concerning the production of witnesses and evidence, the defendant’s right to
counsel, the composition of military commissions, and restrictions on plea bargaining. Id.
Finally, evidentiary matters in military commissions differ from evidentiary standards in
courts-martial proceedings because they do not place any restrictions on self-incrimination,
lower the standards for relevance, fail to grant defendants search and seizure rights, utilize
lenient restrictions on hearsay, and limit disclosure of exculpatory evidence that is confi-
dential. Id.
166. Gregory S. McNeal, Institutional Legitimacy and Counterterrorism Trials, 43 U. RICH.
L. REV. 967, 1007 (2009).
167. In determining the constitutionality of military commissions, members of the
Court have compared the procedures utilized by the MCA of 2009 to the procedures of a
regularly constituted court prescribed by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention.
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631–32.
1000 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
fulfills preconditions historically used to justify military commission.
The MCA of 2009’s actual procedures will be evaluated, and any devia-
tions between the UCMJ and the MCA will have to be justified by the
Executive. Finally, the Court will look to international law for gui-
dance. Here, this comment has argued that the MCA of 2009 fails to
fulfill each of these factors and their use is constitutionally unjustifi-
able in the context of a capital case. It appears the Obama Administra-
tion has reached the same conclusion and has recognized the risk of
utilizing military commissions for capital proceedings.168
IV. Why the Obama Administration Has Authorized the New
York City Terror Trials
A. Federal Courts and Criminal Justice in the War on Terror
At first blush, one might think that Article III courts present the
greatest obstacles for successful capital conviction of an unprivileged
enemy belligerent. The federal courts are not typically associated with
wars and provide greater procedural safeguards than courts-martial
and military commissions. This, however, is not a typical war and mili-
tary commissions have already failed. Moreover, for those who have
witnessed the recent proliferation of terrorism related cases and con-
victions in the federal courts, the Obama Administration’s decision to
institute the New York City Terror Trials comes with little surprise.169
The reality is that, to date, Article III federal courts have secured
almost every conviction against a person detained in the War on Ter-
ror.170 The federal courts have also served as the forum for the only
capital trial of an enemy combatant.171 In an interview recently aired
168. See President’s Statement on Military Commissions, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 364
(May 15, 2009).
169. See Kelly Moore, The Role of Federal Criminal Prosecutions in the War on Terrorism, 11
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 837 (2007).
170. One scholastic effort has identified 289 defendants in 119 cases involving terror-
ism charges in the federal courts. See ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 8, at 6. Based on infor-
mation alleged in indictments, the study defined terrorism cases as “encompass[ing]
prosecutions that are related to Islamist extremist terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda
or individuals and organizations that are ideologically or organizationally linked to such
groups. Id. at 5.
171. Special Verdict Form, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D.Va.
Mar. 28, 2002) (No. Crim. 01-455-A). The Moussaoui trial resulted in a hung jury and
resulted, as the default, in a sentence of life in prison without parole. Id. at 13.The trial will
likely be the model for the defense in the New York City Terror Trials if the suspects are
not allowed to represent themselves. Thus, a review of the jury’s findings in Moussaoui is
important. There, the jury found, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, eight of
ten aggravating factors for Count I (Conspiracy to Commit Acts of Terrorism Tran-
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before Super Bowl XLIV, President Obama tallied 190 convictions of
terrorists in the federal courts.172 This number is substantiated by the
DOJ’s website, which lauds the federal criminal justice system for con-
victing 145 of 160 defendants accused of crimes associated with terror-
ism.173 Since 2007, this total has grown to 195 convictions with 74
pending cases.174 An even more recent study, sent to members of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, counts 403 such convictions.175
Terror-related prosecutions appear to be increasing on a daily ba-
sis. The particular venues of choice have been within the Southern
District of New York and the Eastern District of Virginia.176 To assist in
the U.S. DOJ’s efforts, “Congress has given . . . a formidable arsenal of
criminal statutes to deploy in terrorism prosecutions.”177 This includes
both general charges, like murder of a protected person, and alterna-
tive charges, like false statements. Through these provisions, the DOJ
has convicted suspected terrorists including American citizens, for-
eign aliens, and suspects who targeted military personnel, as well as
convicted for conduct that occurred internationally and domesti-
cally.178 The most common charge has been based on the material
support statute, under 18 U.S.C. § 2339 (2006), which encompasses
forty-eight conceivable offenses and has resulted in seventy-three con-
scending National Boundaries). Id. at 1–5. Of the twenty-three mitigating factors offered
by the defense, at least one juror found the existence of eleven factors plus one additional
mitigating factor. Id. at 6–9. Nine agreed that Moussaoui’s “unstable early childhood . . .
resulting in orphanages and having a home life without structure . . . ,” and that his “father
had a violent temper and physically and emotionally abused his family” constituted mitigat-
ing factors. Id. at 7. Many accredit the one juror who found twelve mitigating factors as Mr.
Moussaoui’s savior. Though, it should be noted, that there were three jurors who each
found the existence of one factor not offered by the defense and handwrote onto the
verdict sheet: “That Zacarias Moussaoui had limited knowledge of the 9/11 attack plans.”
Id. at 9.
172. Lyn Sweet, Transcript of Katie Couric Super Bowl Interview with President
Obama, available at http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/2010/02/katie_couric_super_bowl_
obama.html (Feb. 7, 2010).
173. See DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: PROSECUTING AND DETAINING TERROR SUSPECTS
IN THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2009).
174. Interestingly, “of the 214 defendants whose cases were resolved as of June 2, 2009
(charges against 75 defendants were still pending), 195 were convicted either by verdict or
by  guilty pleas. This is a conviction rate of 91.121%.” See ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 8, at
5–7.
175. Leah Nylen, DOJ Counts 400 Terrorist Convictions in Civilian Courts, MAINJUS-
TICE.COM, Mar. 26, 2010, http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/03/26/doj-400-terrorist-con-
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victions.179 Though no capital sentences have resulted, six defendants
have been convicted of potentially capital charges under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2332 (2006) related to the killing of a U.S. National.180
B. The New York City Terror Trials
The decision to authorize the New York City Terror Trials, per-
haps more than any other decision instituted by the Obama Adminis-
tration short of health care, has drawn popular discussion and revolt.
On both sides of the aisle, political and social commentators have
drawn upon a common set of themes to condemn or praise the Ad-
ministration’s decision. While polls reveal general uncertainty by the
American public towards the trial,181 and many years still separate
their commencement, one thing is certain—the decision represents a
bold step in the War on Terror.
The DOJ has yet to unseal an indictment or specify the charges
against the suspects, though the crimes will assuredly be based upon
the 2973 murders of American civilians that occurred on September
11, 2001.182 The accused are: Khalid Sheik Mohammed, Walid
Muhammad Salih Maubarek Bin Attash, Ramzi Binalshib, Ali Abudal
Aziz Ali, Mustafah Ahmed Adam Al Hawsawi, and Mohammed Al
Kahtani.183 Before military commissions under the MCA of 2006, they
had all been charged with conspiracy, murder in violation of the laws
of war, attacking civilians, attacking civilian objects, intentionally caus-
179. See id. at 11. The “material support” statute criminalizes the following:
[Providing] money, property, or services, lodging, training, false identification,
communications equipment, personnel (including oneself), weapons or lethal
substances, explosives, transportation, safe houses, facilities, or expert advice or
assistance, knowing that the support is to be used by someone else in connection
with a range of offenses including murder, kidnapping and the violation of ter-
rorism statutes.
Id. at 13.
180. Id. at 11–12.
181. A Rasmussen Poll indicated that fifty-one percent of Americans oppose the
Obama Administration’s decision. However, more locally, the same poll indicated that a
small plurality of New Yorkers—forty-five percent—believed that the trial is a good idea.
Dan McLaughlin, Nine Reasons Why the New York City Terror Trials Are a Bad Idea, NEW
LEDGER, Nov. 18, 2009, available at http://newledger.com/2009/11/nine-reasons-why-the-
new-york-city-terror-trials-are-a-bad-idea.
182. For an interesting review of the suspects’ journey through military commissions
and CSRT hearings, see Adine S. Momoh, Gaming the System, “Are You Saying If We Plead
Guilty We Will Not Be Able to Be Sentenced to Death?”, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE)
5119 (2009) (describing the five suspects’ efforts to plead guilty to capital charges in order
to receive the death penalty and obtain martyrdom or end their nightmarish detention).
183. See John Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law,
102 AM. J. INT’L L. 346, 361–62 (2008).
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ing serious bodily injury, destruction of property in violation of the
law of war, terrorism, and providing material support for terrorism.184
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed has been portrayed as the lynchpin
and is accused of masterminding the September 11th terrorist attacks.
As early as 1996, Mohammed is alleged to have proposed the opera-
tional concept to Osama Bin Laden. He is also alleged to have “ob-
tained approval and funding from [O]sama Bin Laden for the attacks,
overseeing the entire operation, and training the hijackers in all as-
pects of the operation in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”185 The charges
alleged against the other five suspects are less noteworthy, but tangen-
tially connected to the September 11th terrorist attacks.186
This conduct, if connected to the operation of Al Qaeda and Sep-
tember 11th, is capitally cognizable under 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (2006)
and other U.S. Codes. Since no indictment has been filed, however,
DOJ has yet to capitally authorize the case. This has not stopped Presi-
dent Obama and Attorney General Holder from indicating they will
seek the death penalty against the five suspects.187
The DOJ has taken several steps in preparation for trial. Many
believe that Judge Lewis Kaplan, who is currently presiding over Ah-
med Ghailani’s case involving the bombings of American Embassies in
Africa and whose court holds the capital indictment against Osama
Bin Laden, has been tapped for assignment of the case.188 David Ras-
kin, “one of the last remaining members of a cadre of seasoned terror-
ism prosecutors in the Manhattan office,” has also been tabbed as the
frontrunner for lead prosecutor and has taken time off his other du-
ties in the office to focus on the September 11th case.189 Likewise,
local defense counsel have clamored for the position of lead counsel
and a “‘death list’—a cadre of about 20 veteran defense lawyers in
New York who have broad experience in death penalty and other
184. Id. at 362.
185. Id.
186. See id. (describing more fully the circumstances and charges against the other
conspirators).
187. In an interview in Tokyo, Japan shortly after the announcement of the trials, Presi-
dent Obama stated. “I’m absolutely convinced that Khalid Sheik Mohammad will be sub-
ject to the most exacting demands of justice. The American people insist on it. My
administration will insist on it.” Catherine Herridge, Michael Levine & Assoc’d Press, U.S.
Likely to Seek Death Penalty for Sept. 11 Terror Suspects, FOXNEWS.COM, Nov. 13, 2009, http://
www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/11/13/self-proclaimed-sept-mastermind-face-trial-ny/.
188. Benjamin Weiser, Judge Who Gets Terror Case May Be Decided by the Spin of a Wheel,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2009, at A15.
189. Benjamin Weiser, A Prosecutor of a 9/11 Case Who Is Likely to Try Another, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 2010, at A23.
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complex criminal cases” involving terrorism, has been prepared by the
Federal District Court in Manhattan.190
But as quickly as the Obama Administration announced the capi-
tal trials would occur in the Federal Court for the Southern District of
New York—located blocks from Ground Zero in Manhattan—the Ad-
ministration has appeared to reverse course.191 The trials now appear
headed to the Southern District of New York, the Eastern District of
Virginia, the Western District of Pennsylvania, or worse, a military
commission at Guantanamo Bay.192 The decision is a response to po-
litical and popular upheaval193 and logistical concerns, including an
estimated security cost of over $200 million.194 The Obama Adminis-
tration has recognized that all of these factors were perhaps inadver-
tently diminished prior to the initial announcement in November
2009.195
Whether or not the New York City Terror Trials result in
America’s first capital conviction in the War on Terror, this Comment
argues that the federal courts have become the only legitimate source
for criminal justice and capital punishment in the War on Terror. In
the last ten years, the Bush and Obama Administrations have secured
hundreds of federal convictions against those once labeled enemy
combatants and now held as unprivileged enemy belligerents. The re-
ality of criminal justice in the War on Terror proves that trials through
Article III courts are the most advantageous and realistic means of
securing a capital conviction against an unprivileged enemy belliger-
ent. This fact, if realized, should quiet the popular shock and dismay
surrounding the Obama Administration’s decision to institute the
New York Terror Trials.
190. Benjamin Weiser, For 9/11 Cases, Calling on a Short List of Veteran Lawyers, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2009, at A29.
191. Mike Allen & Kasie Hunt, White House Drops Plan for New York City Terror Trials,
POLITICO.COM, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0110/32243.html. It should be
noted that in an interview with Katie Couric, President Obama stated he had not yet de-
cided if the New York Terror Trials would be moved. Sweet, supra note 172.
192. See Scott Shane & Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Drops Plan for a 9/11 Trial in New York
City, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010, at A1.
193. Id.
194. Al Baker, Security for Terrorism Trial Estimated at $200 Million a Year, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
7, 2010, at A25.
195. See Jodi Kantor & Charlie Savage, After 9/11 Trial Plan, Holder Hones Political Ear,
N.Y. TIMES.COM, Feb. 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/15/us/politics/15
holder.html?pagewanted=all.
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Conclusion
Thus far, no one detained by the United States in its War on Ter-
ror has been successfully prosecuted for capital crimes. While in the
future this could change, given the institution of capital charges
against the five suspected September 11th masterminds, this Com-
ment predicts that no successful or constitutional capital prosecution
of an unprivileged enemy belligerent will ever take place through
courts-martial proceedings or military commissions. The constitu-
tional infirmities arising from the term unprivileged enemy belliger-
ent and lack of procedures utilized by current military commissions
fail to meet the standards for due process and reliable sentencing as
mandated by the Fifth and Eighth Amendments.
Instead, and as recent developments prove, the capital prosecu-
tion of detainees held in the War on Terror must take place in front
of federal courts. By default, the Executive has been forced to reach
this conclusion as a result of the Bush and Obama Administrations’
failure to create constitutionally adequate military commissions or
comply with the terminology of the Rules of War.196
This problem, however, is obviated by the Obama Administra-
tion’s decision to seek capital charges against the six detainees
through an Article III court. In front of a federal court, the six Sep-
tember 11th co-conspirators no longer stand as unprivileged enemy
belligerents. Instead, the defendants have been bestowed the full pan-
oply of rights afforded by the Constitution to all persons accused of a
criminal charge in an Article III forum. The Obama Administration
has thus realized the ironic reality that the label unprivileged enemy
belligerent must be repudiated to secure America’s first capital convic-
tion in the War on Terror. In fact, the Constitution requires nothing
less when the government seeks to extinguish an individual’s life—no
matter how they are labeled or their crimes defined.
196. See Honigsberg, supra note 10, at 9.
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